Berlin Lab – Aging Societies and Migration

 

The Berlin Future Lab explores the links between demographic aging and the role migration might/should play in the future. The research team at the German Center for Integration and Migration (DeZIM) has compiled facts and guiding questions on the topic to serve as a knowledge base for the Future Lab participants.



Intro Text by Marcus Engler (DeZIM)

An aging society

The numbers

Germany is among the countries that is strongly affected by demographic aging. This process is the result of longer life expectancy and a birth rate that has been significantly below replacement level since the 1970s. According to forecasts, the aging of society will continue and intensify. The share of pensioners (currently 67+ years) will significantly increase from currently 33 percent to 43 percent in the best scenario and to 61 in the worst case (2070), according to latest population projection (Destatis 2025). Moreover, the number of people aged 80 and over – an important indicator when assessing future nursing care needs – will increase considerably, rising from 6.1 million in 2024 to around 8.5 to 9.8 million in 2050. According to the projection, the number of people of working age (20 to 66 years) will drop as the large cohorts of the baby boomer generation retire and are replaced by younger, smaller cohorts (2024: 51.2 million; 2070: 41,2 million in scenario with moderate migration).

Labor shortage

The process of demographic aging has already severe negative consequences which are expected to aggravate in the future. Already at present, Germany faces a significant labor shortage. While this trend has recently slowed down due to the economic crisis, experts see the shrinking pool of (skilled) workers as one of the key factors holding back economic growth. This labor shortage is particularly pronounced in some sectors and regions. Large cities such as Berlin are less affected by aging processes because they attract more young people. On the flipside, some rural regions are facing more pronounced aging – urban-rural differences are widening. Rural regions in particular have a great need for immigration, but this is where the greatest resistance to immigrants can be observed, and right-wing extremist parties are disproportionately successful, even in the suburbs of Berlin. Several studies already point to a crisis in nursing care. Studies have measured higher mortality rates as a result of a lack of nursing staff.

Other negative effects of the aging process mentioned in the literature include: a collapse of social security systems; a loss of innovative capacity; and an overrepresentation of the concerns of older people in politics and neglect of the interests of younger people. As a result, important issues for the future are not being adequately addressed.

Political responses

These challenges are leading to intense and controversial political debates. Possible solutions include further increasing the working life span, lowering pension levels, reducing benefits for illness and care, and increasing the labor force participation of women. The future shape of immigration to Germany is also the subject of ongoing debate.

 

The role of migration

A more diverse society

In recent decades, immigration to Germany has significantly cushioned the effects of demographic aging and its negative consequences. Without the significant net migration the age structure of the German society would be even more unfavorable. As a result of immigration, the population in Germany became more divers. Today a quarter of the population has a migration history (21,4 million out of 82,8 million 2024; 16,1 million are born abroad) (DESTATIS 2025; Statistik Berlin Brandenburg 2025). This proportion is significantly higher among younger age cohorts. This diversity is expected to increase. Against this backdrop, political debates will increasingly be unable to be conducted along the familiar lines of immigrants versus non-immigrants.

The celebration narrative

Since the turn of the millennium at the latest, there has been an intense debate in Germany about the demographic aging of the population, which poses major challenges for the economy and social security systems. The link with the issue of immigration was initially established by academics but was also taken up in media and political debates in which the so called migration celebration narrative (De Haas 2024) was very present (Schimany 2008).

Over time this narrative gained in importance, shaped the political debate and led to a continuous liberalization of labor migration law and integration policies. Governments aimed at both making a better use of the domestic potential of immigrants and becoming more attractive to foreign workers in the face of growing international competition. First important reform steps included the Immigration Act (2005), which was followed by many minor changes (SVR 2014:72-78; SVR 2011: 64-69). However, labor migration numbers, particularly from non-European countries, increased only slowly, and calls for further liberalization of the migration law and improvements to migration infrastructure as well as migration marketing were regularly made (SVR 2019:14-47).

However, labor migration numbers, particularly from non-European countries, remained low, and calls for further liberalization of the law and improvements to migration infrastructure as well as migration marketing were regularly made. Admittedly, there was a shift in political sentiment (including the rise of the far-right AfD party) and political restrictions following the large refugee movements of 2015/16. Restrictive measures only applied to humanitarian migration and were accompanied by increased integration expectations and offers for recognized refugees. In the area of economic migration, the pro-migration narrative remained unchallenged. Both the grand coalition (in 2019) and the center-left government (in 2023) passed further comprehensive liberalization pacts.

Contested ground

As in other countries, migration remained a central issue of contestation. Triggered by the large refugee movements of 2015/16 a shift in political sentiment occurred, including the rise of the far-right AfD party. However, the restrictive measures that followed applied to humanitarian migration only, while in the area of economic migration, a supporting narrative remained dominant. Accordingly, both the grand coalition (in 2019) and the center-left government (in 2023) passed further comprehensive liberalization pacts (SVR 2024). Again, the restrictive responses to the renewed large-scale refugee movements of 2022/2023 did not spill over to labor migration policies (Engler et al 2024). At the same time, there is a stronger counter-narrative supported by right-wing political forces. This so-called remigration narrative is openly racist and calls for the return or emigration of millions of people with a history of immigration, including German citizens (Angeli/Mendes/Schäller 2024). The majority of people and political parties reject such a narrative and continue to hold more positive and differentiates views on migration (e.g. Wieland 2024) while being increasingly sceptical towards migration management (e.g. More in Common 2025). Even the far-right AfD acknowledges in its election manifesto for the 2025 federal election that some level of economic immigration might be necessary (Angeli 2025).

 

A European and global phenomenon

Competition for labor

Germany should not be viewed as an isolated case. On the one hand, similar aging processes are taking place in parallel in numerous industrialized and, in some cases, emerging countries. This means that immigration will not come from Europe as it has in past decades. The numbers have already declined significantly. Immigration must come from other world regions. On the other hand, it means that Germany will face much stronger competition for labor from numerous other countries. The long-standing race for the best minds will intensify and also extend to people who are less formally highly qualified.

A slow policy response

The German migration debate and policy is only very tentatively addressing these realities. Although numerous liberalizations of immigration law have been implemented and the migration infrastructure has been improved (e.g., Federal Agency for; Make it in Germany portal; planned Work&Stay Agency), the system remains cumbersome, overly complex, and opaque. The number of labor migrants from non-European countries has risen, but has recently stagnated. Surveys also repeatedly show that Germany ranks far down in international rankings as a popular destination. Recruited skilled workers and migrants born in Germany are considering leaving the country (or are already doing so).

Expectations vs. reality

The expectations of politicians and the general public do not match the demographic reality. The widespread expectation seems to remains that immigrants should be similar to “us” and have the same religion, skin color, cultural background, and come from a similar education system. The implicit expectation seems to be that migrants should assimilate and adapt more or less silently. This attitude – between open racism and unwillingness to change – means that Germany remains unattractive or is becoming even less attractive for new migrants. Studies show that immigrants are increasingly considering leaving Germany (again) (Best et al 2026; Loscher/Leisenheimer/Komitowski 2025). Research has also shown, that narrative which reduce the role of immigrants to their labor market performance fail to convince (Christinck et al. 2025).

Further Recommended Reads

Angeli, Oliviero (2025): Migration als Wahlkampfthema: Partei-Positionen und Schnittmengen im Überblick, MIDEM-Policy Brief 2025-1 https://forum-midem.de/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/MIDEM_PolicyBrief_2025-1_Migration-als-Wahlkampfthema_.pdf

Angeli, Oliviero / Mendes, Mariana S. / Schäller, Steven (2024): Die Migrationspolitik der Rechtspopulisten: Eine vergleichende Analyse der Wahlprogramme. MIDEM-Policy Paper 2024-2, Dresden
https://forum-midem.de/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/TUD_MIDEM_PolicyPaper_2024-2_Migrationspolitik-der-Rechtspopulisten.pdf

Best, Fabio; Henninger, Jakob; Jacobsen, Jannes; Köhler, Jonas; Lietz, Almuth; Rischke, Ramona; Römer, Friederike; Steinhilper, Elias; Zimmermann, Stefan; Zindel, Zaza (2026): Auswanderung im Fokus: Wer bleibt, wer will gehen? Emigrationsabsichten in Deutschland von Sommer 2024 bis Sommer 2025. DeZIMinutes 16, Berlin, Deutsches Zentrum für Integrations- und Migrationsforschung (DeZIM) https://www.dezim-institut.de/publikationen/auswanderung-im-fokus-wer-bleibt-wer-will-gehen/

Christinck, Lea; Maya Diekmann, Marcus Engler, Pau Palop-García, Ramona Rischke und Zeynep Yanaşmayan (2025): Jenseits der Verwertungslogik? Narrative zu Fachkräftemigration und demografischem Wandel, DeZIM Policy Papers #03 | 25, Berlin https://www.dezim-institut.de/fileadmin/user_upload/fis/publikation_pdf/FA-6359.pdf

DESTATIS Pressemitteilung Nr. 181 (2025): Gut jede vierte Person in Deutschland hat eine Einwanderungsgeschichte, Destatis https://www.destatis.de/DE/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/2025/05/PD25_181_125.html

Engler, Marcus, Magdalena Nowicka, Agnès Bouché and Lea Christinck (2024): Germany country report. Government responses to increased influx of protection seekers in 2015/16 and 2022/23, Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research (NIBR), Working Paper 2023:116.
https://www.dezim-institut.de/publikationen/germany-country-report/

Loschert, Franziska / Marlene Leisenheimer, Doritt Komitowski (2025): Willkommen zurück? Abwanderungsgründe und Rückwanderungspotenziale von aus Deutschland abgewanderten EU- und Drittstaatsangehörigen, Studie im Auftrag der Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
https://collections.fes.de/publikationen/content/zoom/1900371

More in Common (2025): Konstruktiv darüber reden: Fünf Fragen für zukunftsfähige Einwanderungsdebatten https://www.moreincommon.de/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/More-in-Common-Impulspapier-Migration-Zusammenhalt.pdf

Schimany, Peter (2008) Migration und demographischer Wandel. Nürnberg: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF); Forschungszentrum Migration, Integration und Asyl (FZ).
https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/35129

Statistik Berlin Brandenburg (2025): Mehr Deutsche mit Migrationshintergrund https://www.statistik-berlin-brandenburg.de/132-2025

SVR – Sachverständigenrat für Integration und Migration (2024) Kontinuität oder Paradigmenwechsel? Die Integrations- und Migrationspolitik der letzten Jahre. Jahresgutachten 2024. Berlin: Sachverständigenrat für Integration und Migration. https://www.svr-migration.de/publikation/jahresgutachten-2024/

SVR – Sachverständigenrat für Integration und Migration (2019) Bewegte Zeiten: Rückblick auf die Integrations- und Migrationspolitik der letzten Jahre. Jahresgutachten 2019. Berlin: Sachverständigenrat für Integration und Migration. https://www.svr-migration.de/publikation/jahresgutachten_2019/

SVR – Sachverständigenrat für Integration und Migration (2014) Deutschlands Wandel zum modernen Einwanderungsland. Jahresgutachten 2014. Berlin: Sachverständigenrat für Integration und Migration. https://www.svr-migration.de/publikation/jahresgutachten-2014/

SVR – Sachverständigenrat für Integration und Migration (2011) Migrationsland 2011. Jahresgutachten 2011. Berlin: Sachverständigenrat für Integration und Migration. https://www.svr-migration.de/publikation/jahresgutachten-2011-mit-migrationsbarometer/

Wieland, Ulrike (2024): Willkommenskultur in Krisenzeiten. Wahrnehmungen und Einstellungen der Bevölkerung zu Migration und Integration in Deutschland. Bertelsmann Stiftung (Hrsg.). Gütersloh. https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/de/publikationen/publikation/did/willkommenskultur-in-krisenzeiten

 
Marcus Engler

RESEARCH
Deutsches Zentrum für Integrations- und Migrationsforschung Berlin
Social sciences, Economics

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